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Minority Interests in Small Business Entities
John W. Hancock*
W HILE THE SUBJECT MATTER of this article calls for the examination
V of certain aspects of "small business entities," the focus here will
be almost exclusively upon partnerships and corporations. While other
types of entities, particularly the business trust and the business asso-
ciation, merit some consideration in determining the type of entity to be
employed for a particular venture or purpose, their use can, in almost all
cases, appropriately be precluded for one or more of the following some-
what arbitrary, but nevertheless practically sufficient reasons: (1) There
is very little in the way of statute or decision law concerning other types
of entities which can serve as a guide for those initiating a business enter-
prise; (2) Others are quite likely to be rather circumspect and even re-
luctant in dealing with other unfamiliar types of business entities; and
(3) Most other types of entities are not particularly advantageous vis-a-
vis corporations and partnerships for the active operation of a commer-
cial or industrial enterprise. Also, it would be appropriate before enter-
ing into the discussion proper to make the general observation that the
corporate form of entity places more numerous and more difficult ob-
stacles than does the partnership form in the way of one who would
attempt to secure any real or latent minority interests of participants in
the "small business entity." It is for this reason that the problem of pro-
tecting minority interests in close corporations will require the most
attention hereafter. It is also for this reason that the partnership type of
entity deserves more favorably weighted consideration in starting new
enterprises. Later, reference will be made to various methods of struc-
turing a corporation to effect a partnership kind of relation among the
shareholder participants. Conversely, reference will also be made to
means of arranging a partnership and the partners' affairs to effect sev-
eral of the more desirable attributes of corporate structure.
Historical Background
The rights of owners of minority interests in "small business en-
tities" or, more comprehensively and pointedly stated, the fundamental
intra-entity rights and duties of participants in any business entity, have
been so well established at common law that they require but little com-
ment here. Whether it is the basic rights and duties among partners or
those among shareholders which are being examined, any abstract con-
sideration of this subject can only conclude that there is a very strict
* B.S., Yale University; J.D. (June, 1967), Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
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fiduciary duty running between such participants. A partner "cannot,
directly or indirectly (emphasis added), use partnership assets for his
own benefit," and "cannot carry on the business of the partnership for
his private advantage." 1 Concerning the exercise of corporate control,
it has been said, "The majority has the right to control; but when it does
so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as
the corporation itself or its officers and directors." 2 Therefore, the exer-
cise of control in such a way which unreasonably favors those exercising
control or which unfairly affects the interests of other participants would
be an actionable breach of a fiduciary duty.3 This is so even though the
particular means by which or manner in which control is exercised is
proper per se and even though the exercise be void of fraud or mis-
management.
4
The casebooks are filled with examples of how those in control of
a business entity, almost exclusively a small, close corporation, have
been able to "freeze out" effectively those not in control, the minority."
We may be certain that there have been many fold more instances which
never have become the subject of litigation. How can this happen when
the common law imposes on those exercising control or authority a fairly
well defined fiduciary obligation toward those other participants in the
entity whose interests may be affected?6 The answer, succinctly stated,
is that this is the result of the invoking of the "business judgement" rule7
(or a variation of it) which permits those in authority or control wide,
discretionary latitude in the exercise thereof. The "business judgement"
rule, when considered in the abstract, is quite reasonable and even com-
mendable in view of the unreasonable interference and harassment which
it seeks to prevent. Yet, while it would be rather unreasonable to char-
acterize the "business judgement" rule as the antithesis of the fiduciary
obligation principles described above, its general tenor is to permit
greater tolerance of conduct and action whereas that of the latter is to
limit or control such activity. It might therefore be said that any study
of the rights and remedies of minority shareholders is, in effect, the study
1 Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893).
2 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488 (1919); see also Kavanaugh v.
Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919); 18 Am. Jur. 2nd 960-61,
990-93 (1965).
3 Henn, Corporations, 380-83 (1961); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112
U. Pa. L. Rev. 22, 38 (1963).
4 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, supra note 2; Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F. 2nd
389 (6th Cir. 1954).
5 E.g., Oglesby v. Attrill, 105 U.S. 605 (1881); Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342 Ill. App.
489, 97 N.E. 2nd 122 (1951).
6 Latta v. Kilbourn, supra note 1; Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, supra note 2.
7 Henn, op. cit. supra note 3, 364-65; O'Neal, Oppugnancy and Oppression in Close
Corporations, 1 Bost. Coll. Ind'l. & Comm'l. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1959).
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of the resolution of these two concepts with respect to their application
to concrete situations.
A brief reference to the nation's economic history will help us to
understand why the resolution of these two concepts may have proven
to be so difficult. Industrial development in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century was furthered substantially by the pooling of capital and
by the centralization of management for which the corporation was ideal-
ly suited. Also, the insularity from the other participants which the cor-
porate arrangement and its concomitant "business judgment" rule afford-
ed for those in control of the venture's affairs, was both highly valued
and probably necessary under the then existing circumstances. Thrust
as these industrial and commercial developments were upon us and
bound up as they were in our nation's well being, courts at that time
were probably quite reluctant, and perhaps understandably so, to give
effect to time-honored fiduciary principles, which should have been
allowed to govern any intra-entity relationships under judicial exami-
nation, to the detriment of the widely proclaimed "business judgment"
rule except in very extreme or very obvious instances." Fortunately for
most, the trend in succeeding years has been to bring the "business judg-
ment" rule more into its proper perspective. With the proliferation of
corporations many small entrepreneurs came to favor that type of entity
for their own business ventures, initially because of its limited liability
feature and later because of possible Federal income tax advantages. 9
However, the latitude and shelter afforded by the "business judgment"
rule was certainly not lost on those same small corporate entrepreneurs
when they found an occasion to "freeze out" an unwanted shareholder.',
Interests and Expectations
Safeguarding minority interests in a small business entity should be
related to the expectations of the various minority participants, and it
can be fairly said that the expectations of close corporation shareholders
are almost identical to those of general and limited partners" in the
common, garden-variety kind of partnership, and in practice these share-
holders are likely to regard each other more as partners than as share-
holders by reason of the close and personal association which exists.
Both partners and close corporation shareholders usually have a vital
interest in their respective small business entities as the source of their
8 Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1162
(1932).
9 Gibson, Selecting the Form of Entity for a Small Business, 18 Bus. Law. 100, 104
(1962).
10 Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N.Y.Supp. 629 (1908), aff'd. 196
N.Y. 510, 89 N.E. 1114 (1909).
11 1 O'Neal, Close Corporations, 13-16 (1958).
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employment and as their major capital investment. Also, partners and
close corporation shareholders almost without exception desire to limit
participation in their entities to those of their own choosing. Finally,
pervading these and all other expectations and objectives is the keystone
element of mutual trust and dependence among partners and sharehold-
ers. Let us for a moment compare these expectations with the expecta-
tion (note the singular) of the shareholder in a giant commercial or
industrial enterprise. The latter can be summarily described as having
made an investment of passive concern committed without any intended
recourse to a management group probably unknown by the shareholder
and perhaps intelligibly based upon already established indicia of its suit-
ability for investment purposes. Significantly, the expectations of those
involved in a small business entity are most commonly (1) multi-faceted,
(2) the active concern of the party, and (3) based primarily upon the
anticipated future reliability of others involved with the participant.
Based on these major differences the interests of a minority owner of
a small business entity require something totally different in the way of
organizational planning than would be devised for a major corporate
enterprise.
Selection of Form for a Small Business Entity
Planning for the protection of the various interests and the securing
of the expectations of the members of a business, including the interests
and expectations of those who may constitute a minority, requires at first
the selection of the form of entity which will best satisfy these and other
needs. 12 Although a summary conclusion has already been stated to the
effect that the partnership form of entity is to be preferred to the cor-
porate form for the limited objective of protecting various minority inter-
ests, it is quite obvious that the protection of these interests is but one
of the many factors to be given consideration in determining the type of
entity to be employed for a particular undertaking. Indeed, other factors
may very well be entitled to much greater weight in making this decision
and the factor here considered and discussed will seldom be the deter-
mining factor. Several of the other factors to be considered are (1) the
incidence of local, state, and Federal taxes, (2) the need for limiting the
liability of the participants, (3) the general nature and scope of the busi-
ness, (4) various statutory sanctions and bars, and (5) the need for con-
tinuity and transferability of interests.
It becomes necessary at this point to state why, in the opinion of the
writer at least, a partnership is to be preferred to a corporation from the
isolated standpoint of safeguarding various minority interests and expec-
tations. For a "minority partner," the Uniform Partnership Act, which
12 Gibson, op. cit. supra note 9.
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has been adopted as statute law in almost all of the states, serves as both
a sword and a shield. First, the Act states in express and certain terms
the fiduciary relation of each of the partners to the partnership and
makes him accountable therefor. 3 Second, the act directly or indirectly
proscribes the exercise of control in certain ways which might tend to
injure or to exclude those in the minority by altering or abrogating the
expressly stated or legally implied provisions of the partnership agree-
ment.1 4 For instance, no partner is entitled to any remuneration except
that which might have been provided in the partnership agreement, 15
and that same partnership agreement cannot be altered to provide for
increased or decreased salaries without the assent of all of the partners.'6
The continued maintenance of this absolute protection obtains in all
instances except where it has been intelligibly and expressly waived in
the original partnership agreement or any amendment thereto.17 Also,
each partner has, again with the exception of those instances involving
the waiver or surrender thereof, equal rights in the management of the
business,' the right to limit the admission of others to the partnership,19
and perhaps most important of all, the right to have his defined equity
interest in the partnership protected against dilution or impairment by
the other partners. 20 Third, in the event of any dissension among the
partners resulting from an attempt to exclude a partner from the man-
agement of the firm's affairs, or in any way which the partner deems
injurious to his own interests, or for any other reason however arbitrary,
the partner has the right to cause a dissolution2 ' even though the part-
nership agreement might expressly attempt to bar such a course of action
for all intents and purposes.22 Also, upon causing any such dissolution,
the partner is entitled to have his interest in the partnership paid over
to him in due course in a manner which is specifically set forth and sub-
ject only in the case of wrongful dissolution to certain restrictions and
allowances for damages caused to the other partners. 23 In essence, the
formation of a partnership under the Uniform Partnership Act can, in
the partnership agreement, provide for the irrevocable fixing of the indi-
vidual partner's expectations as to salary and as to the maintenance of
13 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 21.
14 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18(h).
15 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18(f).
16 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18(h).
17 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18.
18 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18(e).
19 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 18(g).
20 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 26, 18(a), 18(h).
21 Uniform Partnership Act, See. 31(1) (b).
22 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 31(2); Crane, Partnership, 400-404 (1952).
23 Uniform Partnership Act, Sec. 38.
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the principal of his investment and the return thereon unless the power
to amend the partnership agreement is expressly granted otherwise.
Even if no provision is made concerning remuneration or return on
investment, each partner nevertheless finds himself in the same relative
position to his associates with respect to their ultimate rights to the
assets of the partnership which he originally contemplated at the time
of formation of the firm. However, of all the various factors which can
properly be considered, there are two, the necessity or desire to limit
individual liability and Federal income tax consequences, which are most
often deemed to be of paramount importance. Where the limitation of
a member's liability to the capital invested is desirable (e.g. where the
personal wealth of any participant is substantial or the degree of risk
involved in the contemplated enterprise may be great), the election of
the corporate form of doing business is indicated. The structure of the
rate schedules of Federal personal and corporation income taxes also
tends to favor the employment of the corporation in many situations. 4
This generally results from the comparative facility with which corporate
income can be accumulated as capital at tax rates which are extremely
favorable. Now concerning the weighing of these two major factors in
the choice of the type of entity to be made for the venture, there are
several considerations, both legal and practical, which should be under-
taken and which might lead to the use of the partnership as the vehicle
which offers the best combination of realizable attributes. Concerning
the relation of the incidence of Federal income taxes to the choice of the
type of business entity, most attorneys are undoubtedly quite familiar
with the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code 25 and
have probably considered its election on several occasions. However,
statistics indicate26 that very little advantage has been taken of Sub-
chapter R of the Internal Revenue Code 27 which permits partnerships
meeting certain criteria to elect to be taxed as a corporation. The use of
the partnership form of entity supplemented by the partnership's avail-
ing itself of Subchapter R may be indicated in many instances where
most or all factors other than those related to Federal income taxes sug-
gest the use of a partnership, but where the corporate tax consequences
would otherwise tip the balance in favor of that form of doing business.
As mentioned above, the desire of one or all of the participants to limit
their liability to their investment in the entity is often of major impor-
tance. However, this particular feature of the incorporated enterprise all
too often proves to be illusory. Individual liability may be imposed upon
24 Gibson, op. cit. supra note 9, 104.
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Secs. 1371-77.
26 Bitker, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation, 612-13, note 3 (3rd Ed. 1964).
27 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Sec. 1361.
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the shareholders for a corporation's debts where the corporation has
been found to have been "too thinly capitalized" in relation to what its
undertakings and obligations had become, and such a deficiency may be
found to have existed even though the corporation has met all of the
statutory requirements with respect to the maintenance of capital .2
Also, it frequently happens that a small corporation can secure necessary
financing and credit only when the officers or major shareholders person-
ally obligate themselves as co-signers of the corporation's promissory
obligations and consequently this particular corporate attribute is of no
avail. Of interest to some practitioners may be the possibility, admit-
tedly quite limited in actual practice, of partners being able to limit their
liability arising out of a particular contract or undertaking by providing
in express terms that the obligee or promisee may look only to the part-
nership estate for fulfillment or satisfaction.29 But, because of the almost
total lack of decision law or other treatment of this topic, this device
should be employed only in the most appropriate circumstances and then
only with great care being taken to define the partnership estate and to
make it subject to no unauthorized impairment by the partners.
Need for Planning
Although involvement either as a general or a limited partner is to
be preferred to participation as a minority shareholder for the isolated
objective of protecting one's interests and expectations in a small busi-
ness entity, other factors suggesting the use of a corporation will often
seem more compelling and a corporation will be formed. The common
law principles and statutory requirements of fiduciary obligation to
which officers, directors, and majority shareholders exercising control
are subject, should serve to deter those parties from attempting many
of the more obvious and deliberately inimical acts which directly injure
minority owners, and at the same time should afford a legal or equitable
remedy for those shareholders affected. However, as the means employed
to defeat the interests of the minority shareholders become less obvious
and the manner in which these means are employed become more subtle,
the minority shareholder is less likely to avail himself of any ultimate
remedy to protect his basic shareholder rights and interests much less
his reasonable expectations as an active participant in a small business
entity. 0 In order to secure the necessary protection against invasion or
encroachment in this last described penumbral area, various methods
28 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Ballantine, Corpora-
tions, Chapter X generally (1946 Ed.).
29 Marion Machine Foundry & Supply Co. v. R. T. Harris Interests, 26 S.W. 2nd 449
(Tex. App. 1930); 68 C.J.S. 634-636 (1950).
30 Sneed, Stockholder Votes Motivated by Adverse Interests: The Attack and the
Defense, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 961, 974-98 (1960).
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and devices have been employed with varying degrees of success. Share-
holders' agreements, voting trust agreements, long term employment con-
tracts, high vote requirements, and the use of several classes of stock
with varying rights and privileges are some of the more common methods
and devices, and of these perhaps the most common is the shareholders'
agreement.
Shareholder's Agreements
The shareholder's agreement is the device which singly is the most
adaptable for the purpose of securing the small business shareholder's
unique expectations, especially those having to do with employment and
salary,31 a reasonable return on his investment as initially contem-
plated,32 and choosing who his associates shall be, and such agreements
have been successfully used and tested for these purposes. Shareholder's
agreements can also be devised with the primary objective in mind of
allowing the minor shareholder or shareholders to so control or limit the
action of the officers, board of directors, or majority shareholders by vir-
tue of their strategically arranged status that they can assure the con-
tinued enjoyment of their originally expected privileges as "member
shareholders." This latter type of agreement which, in effect, gives the
minority a veto over the power of the majority, also serves the purpose
of preventing the majority group from diluting or "squeezing out" the
interests of the minority shareholders by various methods involving cor-
porate reorganizations or recapitalizations which, if resourcefully and
cleverly done, can avoid the limitations and bars of the corporation stat-
utes designed to prevent such wrongs. 33 Shareholder's agreements then
would seem to be a most ideal and practical way of assuring any "would
be" or "ab initio" minority shareholder of realizing his expectations in
whole or in part. But in practice, majority shareholders or their con-
trolled directors and officers all too often have been able to disregard the
covenants of these agreements and to incur no legal or equitable penal-
ties or judgments in so doing. These consequences have been the result
of a number of very strict judicial attitudes which had their bases in our
economic history as did the judicial attitudes toward the "business judg-
ment" rule. It would be well to know and appreciate why these attitudes
developed and why they have persisted if we are to base the well-being
of our clients on something which may be susceptible to being negated
31 Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936); but see Meck, Employment of
Corporate Executives by Majority Shareholders, 47 Yale L. J. 1079 (1938).
32 Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2nd 16, 203 N.E. 2nd 577 (1964); Pheterson, Mandatory
Dividend Provisions in Shareholders' Contracts, 9 Syracuse L. Rev. 239 (1958).
33 O'Neal, Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze
Outs," 45 Minn. L. Rev. 537, 540-44 (1961); Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52
Nw. U. L. Rev. 345, 384 (1957).
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by these attitudes or their underlying rationale. Voting trusts were a
favorite device of a number of predatory industrialists of the late nine-
teenth century and were used primarily to form a pool of the controlling
stock of most or all of the corporations in a particular industry.34 For
these companies, this not only had the salutary effect of deterring cut-
throat competition but also permitted the industry as a whole to deal
with the public as a monopoly. Voting trusts were also used in some
instances for the purpose of insuring absolute and continued control by
a majority group with the end in mind of operating the corporate enter-
prise for their own exclusive interests. While the voting trust was un-
doubtedly used in some other instances to insure continued control for
ethical reasons, this type of arrangement understandably came to be
treated with a great deal of disfavor by the courts which developed the
rationale that the voting trust was unlawful because it severed the voting
power of stock from the beneficial interest in it.3 5 This seems to have
been a rather superficial and legalistic approach but one which, in that
era and under those circumstances, was sufficient. Shareholder's agree-
ments were found to be an alternative which technically did not sever
voting control of stock from beneficial interests. However, courts did not
lose sight of the fact that, if shareholder's agreements were to be given
effect, they equitably severed voting control of stock from the beneficial
interest therein, and such agreements were often found to be a mere
variation of the disfavored voting trust.3 6 A more tenable rationale could
be found to deny legal and equitable effect to shareholder agreements
where they not only set forth who should be elected as directors, but also
provided how the corporation's affairs were to be managed with respect
to certain specifics. These latter covenants were additionally found to be
against public policy, which was alleged to be that a corporation was to
be managed by its board of directors who were responsible individually
and collectively to all of the shareholders, creditors, and the public, and,
being thus obligated, they were bound to exercise their discretionary
judgment in the management of the corporation's affairs, unfettered by
any commitments except those general dictates of common and statute
law.37 This reasoning was criticized and discarded in the leading case of
Clark vs. Dodge38 from which case we can develop two more or less
requisite standards to be observed in attempting to draft a valid share-
34 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
35 Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1890); 19 Am. Jur. 2nd 191-93
(1965).
36 45 A.L.R. 2nd 821; O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agreements Attack,
14 Bus. Law 184, 185 (1950).
37 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 36, 188.
38 Supra note 31.
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holders' agreement. There the agreement between the two sole share-
holders provided, among other things, that the plaintiff minority share-
holder was to be employed as general manager of the corporation so long
as he faithfully, efficiently, and competently performed his duties and
that as compensation, he was to receive one-fourth of the net profits of
the corporation as defined. Upon his discharge, not for cause, he sought
specific performance of the contract and its validity was thereupon
brought into question by the defendant majority shareholder. It was held
that since the contract required the employment of the plaintiff only so
long as he proved to be faithful, efficient, and competent, it "impinged"
only slightly on the discretion of the directors and resulted in no injury
to the shareholders, creditors, or to the public. Further, it was implied
that the performance of the contract was sanctioned by all of the share-
holders, including the defendant, and that by their assent they should be
estopped from objecting to any inferred imposition on the judgment and
discretion of the directors. Reasoning inductively from this decision, we
may fairly conclude that a shareholders' agreement should impose upon
the directors' prerogatives only to the extent necessary to secure the re-
sults desired (generally the party's expectations of employment and re-
turn on investment), and should include all of the shareholders as sig-
natories if this is reasonably possible.3 9 An additional caveat which arises
primarily in connection with corporation charters and by-laws but which
applies also to shareholders' agreements is the intolerance of some courts
toward devices or arrangements which permit the control or management
pattern of the corporation to deviate from the so-called corporate norm.
This subject will be treated in more detail later as a part of the dis-
cussion of charter and by-law provisions. Shareholders' agreements are
also commonly used to control or limit the ownership of stock in a close
corporation.40 Such a use is an attempt to synthesize for shareholders
the delectus personae of partners, and, because of the differing nature of
partner and shareholder status, many legal and practical considerations
are necessarily involved in planning an agreement for this purpose.
"Buy and sell" and "first option" agreements are mainly the means to
serve the ends of the remaining shareholders of a close corporation and
are generally not planned with the objective of affording any absolute
right or remedy for the aggrieved minority shareholder. They are men-
tioned here primarily because they help to fulfill a desire or need of close
corporation shareholders,41 and aside from that they are not within the
purview of this paper. Some further advice about the drafting of share-
holders' agreements appears to be in order.42
39 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 36, 195, 199.
40 2 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 11, 1-80.
41 1 O'Neal, id. at 13-16.
42 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 36, 194, 198, 201, 202.
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1. A recitation of the purposes of the agreement describing the
expectations of the various shareholders and their intention to
realize them should help to obtain favorable consideration of the
agreement in any cause of action brought to effect one of those
cited purposes.
2. It would also seem advisable to limit the term of the agreement
in order to avoid judicial characterization of it as a perpetual
voting trust.
3. Having the corporation bound as a party would not impair its
validity and could simplify its enforcement procedurally.
4. Parties should agree to bind all transferees, and the mechanics
for doing this should be established.
Charter and By-law Provisions
Frequent use has been made of the provisions of corporation char-
ters and by-laws to "spread" the control of a corporation and, occasion-
ally, to secure some of the expectations of the member shareholders.
The "spreading" of control among the members is commonly done by
establishing high vote requirements for certain or all shareholder and/or
director actions. 43 Of course, requiring a high percentage vote for any
board of directors action can only serve the purpose of minority par-
ticipants when this requirement is complemented by having that minor-
ity participant or someone allied with him assured of sufficient repre-
sentation on the board. This certainty can be best accomplished by the
undertakings of a shareholder agreement or voting trust agreement. It
is now fairly well settled that the covenants of these agreements obli-
gating the parties either as shareholders or through trustees to vote only
for certain designated persons for directors are a valid exercise of a
proprietary right, and in the case of voting trust agreements, there is
statutory sanction in many jurisdictions for the transfer of this right.
Minority interests can also be assured of representation on the board of
directors where several nominally different classes of stock are employed
and each of these classes, owned exclusively by a single interest, is en-
titled to elect one or more directors.44 However, with this type of arrange-
ment, the right to elect the director(s) is not personal to designated par-
ties, but passes to any transferee of the majority of the stock of any
class, which result may not be the intention of the initial participants.
Assuming that the desired number of directorships for each participant
or interest can be assured by satisfactory and binding arrangements,
there yet remains a major area of doubt concerning the common and
43 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 11, 188-221.
44 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 33, 553-55.
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statutory legality of charter, by-law, or contract provisions for high vote
or unanimity requirements, especially as they may apply to director
actions. A noteworthy case signaling this danger is Benintendi vs. Ken-
ton Hotel45 where a by-law requiring unanimity for any director action
was found to be "almost as a matter of law, unworkable and unenforcible
(sic) ." 4" A 1693 English decision 47 was cited: "prima facie in all acts
done by a corporation, the major number must bind the lesser, or else
differences could never be determined."; and the corporation statutes
were found not to permit any departure from this common law rule.
4s
The implied basis for these decisions is the supposed public abhorrence
of any inaction, paralysis, and consequent waste which might result from
the failure of a corporation, through its directors, to make ordinary and
necessary business decisions on account of any continued stalemate
among the directors.49 Following the Benintendi decision, the legislatures
of New York 50 and many other states amended their corporation laws
for the purpose of permitting corporations to establish their own vote
requirements for shareholder action at variance with those otherwise
supplied by statute. While the apparent intent of these enactments was
to permit the use of checks and balances in the management of corporate
affairs in spite of possible occurrences of stalemate and waste, there have
been several decisions invalidating unanimity or extremely high vote
requirements put into effect under permissive statutes.51 Generally,
though, the dictates of the legislature will be literally observed where
high vote or unanimity requirements have been authorized by remedial
amendments to a state's corporation laws.5 2 The attorney should consider
not only the latitude of control arrangements permitted by statute and
the judicial interpretation of them, but also the possibility of abuses
which may occur where any single party or faction is given an effective
veto power in corporate management. It would seem fitting and proper
that the legal disposition of the exercise of a veto power in any instance
should be a function of its underlying good faith or bad faith motivation
and not be based on its consequences to the corporation or other share-
holders. This, however, presumes both the availability of clear and con-
vincing proof and the realistic expectation of sound equitable adjudica-
45 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2nd 829 (1945).
46 Id. at 831.
47 Hascard v. Somany, 1 Freeman 504 (Court of King's Bench, 1693).
48 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, supra, note 45.
49 Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E. 2nd 893 (1944).
50 New York Stock Corporation Law, Sec. 9 (1948).
51 Kaplan v. Block, supra note 49; O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 11, 198-99, 202, 205-07;
O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use of Special
Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 451, 466, 468 (1953).
52 Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporations, 59 Yale
L. J. 1040, 1056 (1940).
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tion. In the opinion of the writer, high vote or unanimity requirements
in corporate management should be regarded very circumspectly and
should be employed, if at all, only as supplementary to agreements,
provisions, etc., relating specifically to the real expectations of the par-
ties as small business owners. The following reasons are offered to sup-
port this opinion: (1) Statutory and case law concerning their use is not
sufficiently clear and settled; (2) Arguments advanced against their
validity appear quite reasonable and might be given added weight by
particular circumstances; (3) The availability of a veto power invites
deadlock and abuse; and (4) This type of control arrangement does not
deal directly with the real expectations of the minority shareholders.
There is considerably less objection to imposing high vote or unanimity
requirements on those major corporate dispositions and other defined
matters which, if they are deftly handled by those in control, could dilute
or defeat the interests of the minority shareholder. While unanimity or
high vote requirements for these matters would also deviate from the
prevailing corporate norms, they would not interfere with the ordinary
operation of the business and are more practically and legally defensible.
Finally, it should be mentioned that both charter 3 and by-law5 4 pro-
visions have been used successfully to require the payment of dividends
under defined circumstances. Although shareholders' agreements have
also been found to be valid for the purpose of fulfilling this expectation, 55
it would seem to be more appropriate to provide for this in the share
contract (charter) or corporation rules (by-laws) because the existence
of such a mandatory requirement does substantially reduce the discre-
tionary authority of the directors in a major corporate matter.
Planning for Specific Expectations
Planning for the specific interests of a minority shareholder not only
calls for an examination of the advantages and pitfalls of various devices
and methods, but also requires an ultimate decision about the selection
of the means to be employed in securing the individual expectations.
Shareholders' agreements and long term employment contracts are the
two major alternatives for safeguarding employment and salary expec-
tations, and, of the two, the former seems preferable for this purpose.
An agreement between all shareholders can be so drawn that the office
or employment promised becomes the unique consideration flowing to
the shareholder by virtue of his expressed or implied desire to "keep
an eye on" his investment as a shareholder, and, since the promised con-
sideration is unique, he should be entitled to specific performance of the
53 Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E. 2nd 230 (1944).
54 Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E. 2nd 482 (1939).
55 Pheterson, op. cit. supra note 32.
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contract. The same construction of a long term employment contract
would be extremely awkward. Also, the general principles of estoppel
should make it difficult if not impossible for other shareholders to object
to the validity of any employment and salary obligations of the corpo-
ration to which they and their assignees have assented, especially if they
have received any benefits from the same agreement. They are not sim-
ilarly estopped from contesting the validity of a long term employment
contract. It has been previously stated that any provision for mandatory
dividends would be less subject to attack as a part of the charter or by-
laws than it would be as an element of a shareholders' agreement. How-
ever, since such dividend obligations have been regularly enforced wher-
ever they arise, another factor of possible significance may be weighed
in determining where the mandatory dividend clause is to be placed. It
is quite possible that the shareholders collectively may desire to "waive"
the receipt of a dividend during any given period for Federal income tax
purposes. Having the mandatory dividend clause in the charter or by-
laws would be tantamount to the constructive receipt of the dividend.
Its inclusion in a shareholders' agreement would be less likely to be re-
garded as the constructive receipt of a dividend because therein it is
patently an unexecuted and unenforced contractual obligation and only
indirectly a muniment of title subject to being waived.
What to Do in Case of Dissension or "Squeeze Out"
A business entity involves the association of individuals and the
interaction of their personalities and, not infrequently, trouble. Dissen-
sion can occur even in the most carefully planned organizations and the
existence of safeguards may not deter the controlling majority from
attempting to "squeeze out" the minority. When this happens, an attor-
ney for the affected minority should feel obliged to confront the majority
not merely to satisfy any procedural requirements respecting demands,
but primarily with the object in mind of creating a climate where reason
and fair play might be allowed to prevail. This approach should not be
ignored, and where it is successful a better and less costly resolution
of the problem for all is the result.
Where legal action finally becomes necessary, the preparation of the
plaintiff's case must necessarily be founded on the injury sustained as
a consequence of the majority's breach of duty or contract, but it should
also involve the presentation of any relevant facts tending to permit an
inference that the discretion vested in the control group has been grossly
misused.56 Any arguments advanced on behalf of the minority should
also allude directly to the unique status of close corporations and their
shareholders and the increasing recognition being given to the manifest
and implied understandings of the shareholders.
56 Sneed, op. cit. supra note 30, 994-98.
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Remedial Legislation
Any study of the history of arrangements to establish and protect
valid minority interests will show that the courts in considering these
arrangements have tended more recently to examine purpose and intent
and to disregard legal forms and precepts. This salutary trend has been
given further impetus by the legislatures of two states which have pro-
vided in their corporation laws for wide latitude in the making of intra-
entity agreements. North Carolina law5 7 now states that, with respect
to certain close corporations, "no written agreements to which all of the
shareholders have actually assented . . . and which relates to any phase
of the affairs of the corporation . . . shall be invalid as between the par-
ties thereto. . . ." A recent New York enactment 58 reads: "A provision
in the certificate of incorporation otherwise prohibited by law as im-
properly restrictive of the discretion or powers of the board in its man-
agement of corporate affairs shall nevertheless be valid;" and conditions
this validity on unanimous formal assent of the shareholders and on any
transfers being made with notice of the provision. Statutes of two states59
also sanction the voluntary dissolution of a corporation at the instance
of any proportion of its shareholders if the charter so provides.
Such a provision would entitle an individual shareholder to the same
remedy which a partner has available as a matter of law and its avail-
ability might afford the minority shareholder more consideration in the
"councils" of the corporation.
"Buy Out" Contracts
"Buy and sell" agreements and "first option" agreements are usually
drafted and executed only with the purpose in mind of limiting the
transfer of a company's stock. However, "buy out" agreements can also
be drawn with the view in mind of resolving any continued dissension
by committing one party or several parties to purchase the other inter-
ests at the request of any shareholder. An equitable type of "buy out"
arrangement is where the initiating shareholder announces his intent,
states his valuation price per unit of the equity in the corporation, and
thereby obligates the other party or parties to "buy out" or "sell out" at
the appraised unit price. 60 This is used most often where there are two
shareholders each with 50% of the stock, but there is no reason why this
method could not be used where the stock is divided otherwise. Another
possible method would be a mandatory "closed auction" 61 requiring
57 Gen. Stats. of N.C., Sec. 55-73(b) (1963).
58 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Sec. 620(b) (1963).
59 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1701.86(E) (1963); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Sec. 1002 (1963).
60 O'Neal, op. cit. supra note 11, 171-74.
61 Sports Illustrated, October 3, 1966, p. 38 for an article describing the closed auc-
tion sale of the Los Angeles Rams.
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sealed bids and possibly coupled with a proviso permitting the highest
bid to be over-called by a bid at an amount higher by a stated percent-
age of significant proportion (e.g. 20%). These "buy out" contracts
should only be used where the parties involved are sufficiently sophisti-
cated to accept the inference of ultimate disagreement and have enough
financial resources to make any "buy out" commitment workable.
Summary
In meeting the problems posed by the desire to protect minority
interests, the practitioner should fully weigh the advantages available to
those participating in a partnership and should not be influenced by the
parties' desire for personal aggrandizement as corporation owners or
officers. It is the writer's opinion that the securing of minority owner's
interests in a small business corporation is best accomplished by de-
fining them as expectations and making the controlling faction obligated
to observe them. Control and veto arrangements do not directly identify
and deal with these expectations and can easily prove to be the founda-
tion of deadlock, dissension, and abuse. The use of "trust provisions"
in the charter is suggested as an alternative to shareholders' agreements.
The latter should be regarded, however, as a tried and proper vehicle
for the securing of minority interests and deserves the most favorable
consideration. Mandatory dissolution and "buy out" provisions and
agreements can also prove useful as an available remedy where other
arrangements are not feasible or require secondary protection.
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